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In a dynamic framework in which generations are linked by educational background,
we identify an intergenerational externality that is larger for disadvantaged groups. This
provides an argument for aﬃrmative action in higher education based on eﬃciency alone.
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1 Introduction
Aﬃrmative action in higher education is often explained by colleges and universities valuing
diversity of their student bodies (Chan and Eyster, 2003). However, it has been argued that
such preferences may imply eﬃciency costs, as resources are transferred from higher ability
students to lower ability students from disadvantaged groups.
In contrast, eﬃciency enhancing properties of aﬃrmative action have also been suggested.
De Fraja (2002) provides an eﬃciency argument for reverse discrimination based on asymmetric
information. Holzer and Neumark (2000) mention the likely existence of community externalities
and, in particular, of role-model eﬀects (i.e., educated members of a community may have a
positive eﬀect on the education of future generations). This suggests the existence of a positive
community-specific intergenerational externality that, to the best of our knowledge, has not
been modeled before. Accounting for an externality of this type, and under the assumption that
education levels the playing field for families of diﬀerent background, we show that aﬃrmative
action can be justified exclusively on eﬃciency grounds.
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2 The Model
We consider two coexisting communities diﬀerentiated by race R (for instance, black B and white
W ). Within each community, individuals diﬀer both in their ability to benefit from education
and in their family educational background. Ability, denoted by a, is stochastically determined
at birth. For simplicity, we consider that a is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 in both
communities. Educational background of an individual is represented by whether the parent is
uneducated or educated: e−1 = 0, 1.
Individuals live for one period. First, they decide whether or not to acquire higher education.
Studying entails a financial cost that depends on their race, their ability to benefit from education
and on the education of their parents. We assume this cost to be γRe−1C (a). Belonging to a
disadvantaged group, black individuals have to surpass more obstacles, which increases the
costs of acquiring higher education. However, we assume that education levels the playing field,
so that children of educated parents of any race face identical costs.1 Accordingly, we posit
γB0 > γW0 > γB1 = γW1 = 1 to reflect the fact that education is more costly for children of
uneducated parents, and this eﬀect is larger for black children. C (.) is a decreasing and convex
function of ability (i.e., C
0
< 0, C
00
> 0).
Productivity, and thus wages, depend on education alone. Higher education has a positive
eﬀect on wages, so that educated individuals earn higher wages (h) than uneducated individuals
(`). Individuals inelastically supply one unit of labour.
The decision to become educated or not is made by comparing income with and without
education. For each type, characterized by race R and educational background e−1 , it is possible
to determine a threshold value of ability above which individuals will acquire higher education.
We denote by baRe−1 this ability level.
γRe−1C(baRe−1 ) = h− ` R = B,W ; e−1 = 0, 1 (1)
At the threshold ability level baRe−1 , the cost of education equals the gain, in terms of earnings,
of attaining higher education. Children with given R and e−1 whose ability is larger than baRe−1 will
invest in higher education. Individuals of ability a < baRe−1 will not. From (1) and the assumptions
made about γRe−1 , baW1 = baB1 < baW0 < baB0 .
1This assumption is made for simplicity of presentation. The weaker assumption γB1 −γW1 <
¡
γB0 − γW0
¢ γB1 γW1
γB0 γ
W
0
is suﬃcient, although not necessary, to yield the same qualitative results.
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At the end of the period each individual gives birth to another one and dies. Population
is thus constant. Given that a is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, baRe−1 denotes the
probability of remaining uneducated depending on parental educational background and race.
Under the assumptions made we can conclude that, children of educated parents are more likely
to gain tertiary education than those of non-educated ones and, among children of uneducated
parents, black children are less likely to gain tertiary education than white children of the same
ability. The evolution over time of the proportions of educated and uneducated people of race
R in this economy can be described by a Markov chain with the following transition matrix:
PR =
µ baR0 1− baR0baR1 1− baR1
¶
. (2)
Let πR0 and πR1 denote, respectively, the proportions of uneducated and educated people of
race R in each generation. Once the steady state has been reached, the proportion of educated
and uneducated people of each group replicates itself: (πR0 ,πR1 ) = (πR0 ,πR1 )PR. The vector of
steady state probabilities is then:2
πR0 =
baR1
1− baR0 + baR1 and πR1 = 1− ba
R
0
1− baR0 + baR1 . (3)
3 The First Best
Let yRe−1,e be the net income of an individual of race R, family education e−1 and education
e. We define the first best proportions of educated and uneducated individuals of each race R,
a˜R0 and a˜
R
1 , as those which provide the highest aggregate net income. The government then
maximizes πR0 EyR0 + πR1 EyR1 , where:
EyRe−1 = baR0 ye−1,0 + Z 1baR0 yRe−1,1(a)da (4)
stands for the expected utility of children of educational background e−1 and race R. After some
rearrangements, the optimality condition for interior a˜Re−1 is:
γRe−1C(a˜
R
e−1)) = h− `+
EyR1 −EyR0
1− a˜R0 + a˜R1
(5)
Since C is decreasing, a˜R0 > a˜
R
1 . Thus, at the first best, a higher proportion of children of
educated than of uneducated parents undertake higher education within each group. The reason
for this result is that the education of the children of uneducated parents is more costly.
2We assume that costs associated to education are such that baRe−1 is interior for all R and e−1.
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On the other hand, since, at the laissez-faire, the expected utility is larger for children of
educated parents (EyR1 > Ey
R
0 ), all individuals who make their educational choice in the absence
of government intervention end up consuming too little education.
Finally, since the diﬀerence in participation between children of educated and uneducated
parents is larger for B and the diﬀerence in the costs they face is also larger, EyB1 − EyB0 >
EyW1 − EyW0 . Therefore, the diﬀerence between first best and decentralized threshold ability is
larger for black people.
In other words, the individual decision to undertake education is ineﬃcient because people
fail to account for the fact that their getting higher education increases the chances that their
children also will gain access to higher education. This intergenerational externality is higher for
black people, since the diﬀerence in expected income for children of uneducated and educated
individuals is larger within this group.
4 Optimal subsidies
The government may subsidize education in order to internalize the externality. We assume that
subsidies can be dependent on race or ethnicity but not on the education decision previously
made by parents. To finance this policy, it levies a lump-sum tax T on all workers.
The objective of the government is to maximizeX
R
X
e−1
πRe−1
ÃbaRe−1 (`− T ) + Z 1baRe−1
³
h− γRe−1C(a) + S
R − T
´
da
!
subject to the budget constraint 2T =
P
R πR1 SR, where SR, R = B,W , represents the subsidy.
The optimal policy is characterized by the first order conditions corresponding to the lump
sum tax T and subsidies SW and SB. The optimality condition for T yields λ = 1 (i.e.,
the marginal cost of raising one unit is one since lump-sum taxes are non-distortionary). The
optimality condition for each SR is:
∂πR0
∂SR
£
EyR0 −EyR1
¤
+ πR0
∂EyR0
∂SR
+ πR1
∂EyR1
∂SR
−
µ
πR1 + SR
∂πR1
∂SR
¶
= 0.
After some manipulation, these conditions become
SR = EyR1 −EyR0 .
Since EyB1 − EyB0 > EyW1 − EyW0 , it follows that SB > SW . Hence, individuals from the
disadvantaged community receive a larger Pigouvian subsidy.
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5 Conclusions
In this note, we have considered a dynamic framework in which generations are linked by fam-
ily background, which is determined both by family education and appurtenance or not to a
disadvantaged group. We have identified an intergenerational externality that is larger for dis-
advantaged groups provided that education levels out the playing field (i.e., existing diﬀerences
across groups are smaller for educated individuals). This externality can be internalized by
means of Pigouvian subsidies, equal to the size of the externality in each case. Therefore, larger
subsidies for students that belong to disadvantaged groups can be justified on eﬃciency grounds
alone.
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